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URBAN BIAS IN PRICE RISK: THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
FOOD PRICE DISTRIBUTIONS IN 
LOW-INCOME ECONOMIES 
Christopher B. Barrett 
ABSTRACT 
The geography of agricultural marketing has important implications for the stochastic distribution 
of agricultural commodity prices. This paper proposes that objective food price risk differs between rural 
and urban areas of infrastructure-poor economies characterized by spatially concentrated patterns of 
foodgrains storage. This difference implies an urban bias having adverse welfare effects for peasants who 
seasonally switch between net food seller and net food buyer positions. Empirical analysis of rice price 
data from Madagascar suggests that price variability and skewness indeed differ between rural and urban 
areas in ways that adversely influence the relative welfare of rural peasants. 
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URBAN BIAS IN PRICE RISK: 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF FOOD PRICE DISTRIBUTIONS IN LOW-INCOME ECONOMIES 
The geography of agricultural marketing has important implications for the 
stochastic distribution of agricultural commodity prices. This paper proposes that 
objective food price risk is experienced differently in rural and urban areas of 
economies characterized by spatially concentrated patterns of foodgrains storage. 
These differences imply an urban bias, in that they generate adverse welfare 
effects for peasants who seasonally switch between net food seller and net food 
buyer positions. Empirical analysis of rice price data from Madagascar suggests 
that price variability and skewness indeed differ between rural and urban areas 
in ways that adversely influence the relative welfare of rural peasants. 
-
This paper considers the proposition that objective food price risk! is experienced 
differently in rural and urban areas of economies characterized by spatially concentrated patterns 
of foodgrains storage. The principal finding is that in infrastructure-poor countries rural and 
urban price distributions predictably diverge in such a way that rural residents face greater 
objective food price risk than do urban residents. Since greater risk exposure reduces the welfare 
of risk averse individuals, the geography of food prices has adverse welfare effects on the rural 
peasantry. This suggests an important dimension to urban bias thus far ignored, with potentially 
actionable policy remedies having relatively minimal distortions to the rest of the food economy. 
If commercial storage of storable food commodities such as basic grains is concentrated 
in urban areas, as is true in most low-income economies, grain often flows from rural to urban · 
areas in the immediate post-harvest period but reverses direction as the harvest approaches again 
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and rural farm households exhaust stocks and become food buyers. Although this phenomenon 
is common, its impact on the variance or skewness of rural and urban food price distributions 
has thus far been ignored. 2 But if the higher-order moments of food price distributions faced 
by particular subpopulations systematically exceed those faced by others, this alone will generate 
important welfare differences between risk averse agents. 
One can usefully distinguish between three distinct subpopulations. First there are year-
round net food buyers, a group including all non-producers of food, and thus most urban 
residents. Second, there are year-round net food sellers, mainly large commercial fanners. 
Finally, there is a class of peasants who pre~ictably switch between net seller and net buyer 
positions over the course of the agricultural calendar, selling in the immediate post-harvest 
period and buying in the pre-harvest "hungry season." Recent research indicates that a large 
proportion of fanners engage in such seasonal switching of exchange relations - from seller to 
purchaser, then back again [Ellsworth and Shapiro, 1989]. Indeed in Africa, a substantial 
proportion of food producers are net food buyers in aggregate [Weber et aI., 1988; Budd, 1993; 
Barrett and Dorosh, 1995 ]. It is this latter group, whose preferences over the moments of food 
price distributions vary seasonally, 3 that shoulders most of the burden of the geography of food 
/ 
marketing in infrastructure-poor countries, and I follow the literature on urban bias [Lipton, 
1977; Bates, 1981] in focusing primarily on this peasant class. 
The above points are developed over three sections. Section I presents (infonnally) a 
theoretical explanation of rural-urban differences in food price distributions. Section II presents 
corroborating empirical evidence from rice in Madagascar. Section III offers policy and 
research implications. 
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I. Interseasonal and Intraseasonal Supervariability and Superskewness in Rural Food Prices 
Because all people consume food, but only some buy or sell it, food prices affect the 
welfare of everyone, but not in identical ways. Those who sell food enjoy welfare gains from 
higher expected food prices, while those who purchase food prefer lower mean prices. This 
-
follows directly from Roy's Identity. Moreover, since people consume food over many periods 
and food production involves biological lags, food prices are inevitably subject to considerable 
temporal uncertainty. Except under the rare circumstances when the strong assumption of agent 
risk neutrality is defensible, one must thus consider agents' preferences with respect to moments 
beyond the mean (e.g., variance, skewness), as well. Any form of risk aversion implies a 
preference for low variability in real income, and thus in prices.4 Agents' qualitative preferences 
with respect to skewness, however, vary across agents according to their net buyer/seller 
position. Purchasers are harmed by the extraordinary price rises that yield positive skewness 
in price series, while sellers lose from sharp price drops associated with negative skewness 
[Menezes, Geiss and Tressler, 1980]. Fortunately for sellers, a workably competitive storage 
market tends to ensure positive skewness in commodity prices series [Williams and Wright, 
1991; Deaton and Laroque, 1992]. Net sellers thus prefer high means, low variance and 
/ 
positive skewness, while net buyers desire low means, low variance and negative skewness in 
food price series. 
Based on these rather parsimonious descriptions of agents' preferences, one can rank 
order price distributions' welfare effects using the concept of stochastic dominance. One 
distribution, A, dominates another distribution, B, stochastically if an expected utility maximizer 
would always prefer A to B [Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker, 1977; Whitmore and Findlay, 
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1978] . There are different degrees of stochastic dominance, corresponding to different 
assumptions about agents' risk preferences. Section II defines these explicitly and employs 
stochastic dominance techniques to test empirically the hypothesis of urban bias in rice price risk 
in Madagascar. Stochastic dominance is the sense in which I will claim that urban food price 
distributions arewelfare superior to rural distributions for peasants who routinely switch from 
net sellers to net buyers as the crop season progresses. 
Rural smallholders with seasonally-varying preferences over the moments of food price 
distributions systematically suffer from the geography of agricultural marketing prevailing in 
most low-income countries. First, they tend to receive lower mean sales prices over the course 
of the year than do other food sellers. Peri-urban farmers enjoy higher prices during the post-
harvest period when rural smallholders sell, while the rural large farmers are more likely to sell 
during the pre-harvest price peaks when smallholders become purchasers. Second, assuming 
identical price risk aversion across agents, rural smallholders face greater welfare-reducing price 
variability than their urban brethren. Third, while rural large farmers often sell during the 
hungry season, thereby benefitting from positive skewness in prices, smallholders are usually 
hungry season food buyers. Moreover, rural purchasers face more sharply positive hungry 
season food price skewness than do urban buyers. These propositions with respect to mean, 
variance and skewness derive from the concepts of interseasonal and intraseasonal 
-
supervariability and superskewness in rural food prices, introduced next. 
Basic grains storage tends to be concentrated in urban areas of developing economies for 
multiple reasons. Greater population density and higher per capita incomes concentrate 
purchasing power in urban areas. Moreover, following Hotelling [1929], marketing is generally 
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even more spatially concentrated than demand. Rural-urban infrastructure differences magnify 
this tendency toward spatially concentrated marketing. The effect of low rural electrification 
rates, poor rural roads maintenance, unreliable rural communications, and sparse, illiquid rural 
financial networks is transactions and capital costs that are generally higher in rural areas, 
reinforcing the inherent spatial concentration of marketing services. Higher rural operating costs 
demand a higher rate of return to rural commercial storage (i.e., interseasonal price variation). 
Just as the geography of food marketing and storage has a sound basis in economic 
theory, so does this geography have implications for rural and urban food price distributions. 
First, mean rural food prices are below mean urban prices in the immediate post-harvest period, 
but increase more rapidly as the year progresses, eventually exceeding mean urban prices during 
the pre-harvest hungry season, before the cycle recommences with the next harvest. Since rural 
seasonal prices exhibit lower minima and higher maxima than urban seasonal prices, one might 
classify this phenomenon "interseasonal supervariability" in rural food prices, where the prefIx 
"super-" indicates the ordinal ranking of rural measures against an urban base. 
Second, the same conditions that generate a concentration of interseasonal grains storage 
in urban areas -~ higher costs and lower and less concentrated demand -- also serve to thin rural 
markets, especially in the hungry season. The fewer the participants, the less elastic is aggregate 
demand and supply. Because storage is more distant from rural markets, lag times in response 
by arbitraging intermediaries tend to be greater, fuelling price variability. Moreover, if small 
market size and some minimum efficient scale to commercial storage result in high concentration 
ratios, incumbent rural middlemen with market power might rationally stimulate food price 
-
volatility to discourage entry [Newbery, 1978; Hollander, 1994]. Whether due to market 
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thinness, lags in trader "responses, intennediary market power, or some combination, rural food 
price variability may be greater not only interseasonally, but also intraseasonally, especially in 
the hungry season. For consistency's sake, label this hypothesis "intraseasonal supervariability" 
in rural food prices. 
Finally, the nonnegativity constraint inherent to grains storage implies asymmetry in 
storable commodities' price distributions [Williams and Wright, 1991; Deaton and Laroque, 
1992]. Real food price data generally exhibit flat ranges punctuated by upward spikes that tend 
to emerge and dissipate rapidly. However, the regional differences in transactions costs and 
communications efficiency that facilitate urban concentration of commercial food storage also 
inhibit rapid response by arbitragers that might mitigate the duration and intensity of upward 
price spikes in rural areas, which are of course most likely during the hungry season. As a 
result, the positive skewness of prices is likely to be greatest in rural areas during the hungry 
season. Call this hypothesized phenomenon hungry season "superskewness" in rural food prices. 
Figure 1 depicts these three hypothesized phenomena - interseasonal and intraseasonal 
supervariability and hungry season superskewness. Interseasonal supervariability is evident in 
the steeper slope of the rural conditional expectation function. Comparison of the rural and 
urban conditional price distributions reveals intraseasonal supervariability and hungry season 
superskewness. If true, these hypothesized phenomena imply a strong urban bias in the 
distribution of objective price risk in low-income economies. 
Strictly speaking, interseasonal supervariability need not represent any risk, for if each 
period's price distribution is degenerate (i.e., variance equals zero) one can forecast 
intertemporal price patterns perfectly. The issue is instead individuals' ability to smooth 
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Figure 1: Schematic of Rural and Urban Conditional Food Price Distributions 
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consumption optimally through savings and credit. Interseasonal variation in food prices, 
especially when negatively correlated with nominal income, induces savings and borrowing to 
smooth consumption [Deaton, 1990]. If interseasonal food price variability is greatest in rural 
areas, the need for fmancial intermediation is likewise greatest in rural regions. Although 
considerable evidence exists that consumption smoothing occurs through savings [Deaton, 1992; 
Paxson, 1993], rural fmancial networks are notoriously underdeveloped relative to urban 
networks. No comparative empirical evidence exists, but it seems likely that greater demand 
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for intertemporal transactions due to interseasonal supervariability conspires with tighter rural 
credit constraints to inhibit rural consumption smoothing, relative to that of urbanites. If this 
is true, the geography of agricultural marketing and fInance jointly impose welfare costs on rural 
residents not borne by their urban counterparts. 5 
Intraseasonal supervariability implies that a price risk-averse agent would prefer to face 
the urban price series than its contemporaneous rural counterpart. Unless the urban mean is 
substantially lower when such an agent is sell-ing or higher when the agent is buying - which 
will not be the case under interseasonal supervariability in rural prices - the urban price series 
is welfare-superior in a (second degree) stochastic dominance sense. 
Similar results obtain with respect to hungry season superskewness if a downside risk 
averse agent purchases food: s/he would uniformly prefer to face the urban food price 
distribution than the rural distribution, assuming equal mean and variance. Note that large 
farmers with net sales of food in all periods gain from positive skewness in food prices; this 
represents upside welfare risk to sellers. But positive skewness in price is unattractive to 
downside risk averse smallholders who are seasonal net buyers. Hungry season superskewness 
in rural food pr!ces may thus imply welfare differences between wealthy (all-season net seller) 
and poor (hungry season net buyer) farmers, as well as between urban and rural net food buyers. 
II. Rural-Urban Rice Price Distributions in Madagascar 
I test the hypotheses of interseasonal and intraseasonal supervariability and hungry season 
superskewness in rural food prices using regional rice price data from Madagascar. This is not 
meant as a deftnitive set of statistical tests, but merely an empirical corroboration of the 
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plausibility of the concepts mapped out above. Rice is the staple food throughout Madagascar, 
comprising more than half of all cultivated land [MP ARA/F AD, 1988] . Although rice 
production is the nation's main economic activity, an estimated 63 percent of Malagasy rice 
producers are net rice buyers [Barrett and Dorosh, 1995]. Both private and public agricultural 
marketing networks are designed around the movement of paddy or processed rice, 
predominantly in hulled form [Abt Associates, 1991], with 50-75 percent of national commercial 
grains storage concentrated in just three urban areas: the capital city, Antananarivo, and the port 
cities of Toamasina and Mahajanga [Cabinet Fivoarana, 1989]. The human and physical 
geography of rice marketing in the peasant-farming dominated economy of Madagascar thus fits 
well the stylizations of the previous section. 
The data are monthly retail-level observations, January 1983 to December 1991, of 
nominal hulled rice prices from 17 Madagascar's agricultural enumeration regions. Barrett 
[1994a] explains the data in detail. For each regional series, year-specific seasonal indexes, Sit' 
were computed using the ratio-to-moving average method, a simple non-parametric technique 
yielding index numbers that are the ratio of the price observation, Pit' to a twelve-month centered 
moving averag~ price, mit (i indexes region, t indexes time). 
Pit -100 
m. 
It 
l(l~ l~) 
-2 -12~Pit·j+-12L..JPit. k 
J= -5 k =-6 
This removes the trend and cyclical variation from the regional time series, leaving just the 
seasonal and stochastic components, thereby accomodating demand and supply shocks associated 
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with region-specific economic cycles and inflation patterns, so one need not impose national 
indicators across a range of demonstrably heterogeneous sub-economies. 6 
Since the hypotheses to be tested compare the moments of rural and urban price series, 
we next group the specific seasonals geographically and calculate the empirical moments of 
seasonally disaggregated group frequency distributions. The urban group comprises the three 
metropolitan regions with most of the nation's commercial grains storage capacity (Antanana-
rivo, Mahajanga, Toamasina). The other 14 regions constitute the rural group. These two 
regional price distributions are similarly centered: sample mean panseasonal price in the two 
groups differs by less than one percent, a statistically insignificant amount. The peak of 
Madagascar's rice harvest runs from mid-March to late June. The soudure (hungry season) runs 
November through early March. Six bimonthly distributions were constructed for each areal 
grouping. 7 
The three detailed hypotheses generated by section I are that for the distinct rural and 
urban conditional price distributions, rep I t) and ut(p I t), respectively, 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) ~r, t > ~u, t vtEH 
interseasonal supervariability 
intraseasonal supervariability 
hungry season superskewness 
where oj is the ith central moment of the price distribution, and H is the set of hungry season 
months. The computed empirical moments of Madagascar's urban and rural bimonthly rice 
price distributions support these hypotheses (Table 1). Interseasonal supervariability is evident 
in the greater range of rural seasonal means-(87.3-110.8) than urban seasonal means (90.4-
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Table 1: Seasonal Hulled Rice Price Distributions 
Std. Relative 
Mean Dev. c.v.a Skewnessb 
Urban series 
(n =48/period): 
Jan-Feb 109.8 12.5* 0.114 0.3* 
Mar-Apr 107.1 14.9* 0.139 0.4* 
May-Jun 93.2 13.6 0.146 0.1* 
Jul-Aug 90.4 7.2* 0.080 -0.2* 
Sep-Oct 96.1 12.9 0.134 0.5 
Nov-Dec 100.5 12.1 * 0.129 0.3* 
panseasonal 99.5 14.4* 0.145 0.7 
Rural series 
(n = 224/period) 
Jan-Feb 110.8 16.9* 0.152 1.2* 
Mar-Apr 105.2 18.7* 0.177 1.2* 
May-Jun 87.3 12.9 0.148 0.9* 
Jul-Aug 89.7 11.7* 0.131 0.5* 
Sep-Oct 99.5 14.2 0.143 0.1 
Nov-Dec 106.1 14.4* 0.136 0.9* 
panseasonal 99.8 17.2* 0.172 0.8 
a standard deviation/mean b skewness/standard deviation3 
* rural-urban difference statistically significant at the five percent level. 
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109.8), as well as in the higher variance and coefficient of variation of panseasonal rural prices. 
Average interseasonal returns to storage are 25 percent higher in rural areas than urban. 
Intraseasonal supervariability appears in the higher coefficients of variation for each bimonthly 
rural price distribution, and in rural variance greater than urban variance in all periods except 
the peak harvest months of May-June, when rural markets are flush with intermediaries. Hungry 
season superskewness is apparent in the substantially greater positive relative skewness in rural 
prices during the peak of the hungry season, November-February. Most of these differences are 
statistically significant at the five percent level. Since the difference in rural and urban 
panseasonal means is less than one percent, the essential difference between the rural and urban 
rice price distributions is the greater objective price risk faced by rural inhabitants. 
This greater objective price risk exposure of peasants can be demonstrated mostly 
unambiguously through stochastic dominance testing of the general hypothesis that risk-averse 
peasants are worse off facing the rural price distribution than if they could face the urban price 
distribution. Stochastic dominance is an especially useful method of risk analysis under the 
expected utility hypothesis when one has incomplete information about agents' preferences 
[Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker, 1977; Whitmore and Findlay, 1978]. If net seller agents' 
.I 
utility is increasing in income, he will unambiguously prefer the urban conditional price 
distribution, u(p I t), to the rural one, r(p I t,) if and only if 
j = 1, ... , n, and Pj E {non-negative integers} 
In words, if the cumulative mass function for the discrete distribution rep I t) lies everywhere to 
the left of the cumulative mass function for the discrete distribution u(p It), u(p I t) offers 
- 13 -
everywhere better (i.e., higher) prices. If this condition holds, u(p I t) first-degree stochastic 
dominates (FDSD) rep I t). Conversely for a net buyer, 
j = 1, . . . , n, and Pj E {non-negative integers} 
Only then does u(p I t) present everywhere better (i.e., lower) prices than rep It). 
If one is willing to impose a bit more structure on agents' preferences, specifically risk 
aversion, then the more powerful concept of second-degree stochastic dominance (SDSD) 
becomes available. A risk-averse net seller will prefer u(p I t) to rep I t) if and only if 
j = 1, ... , n, and Pj E {non-negative integers} 
Conversely, for a net buyer, 
j = 1, ... , n, and Pj E {non-negative integers} 
With these definitions in place, it should be apparent that SDSD provides an appropriate 
test of the general hypothesis of this paper, that the urban conditional price distribution welfare 
dominates the rural conditional price distribution for risk-averse peasants who seasonally switch 
) 
between net seller and net buyer positions. 
If we assume that Malagasy peasants are net rice sellers from the beginning of the harvest 
in March, and that they are net buyers for at least the last two months of the hungry season 
(January-February), the data indeed indicate u(p I t) dominates rep I t) in a second-degree 
stochastic sense. Figures 2 and 3 show this for two illustrative plots of the rural and urban 
conditional cumulative mass functions: the hungry season period of January-February (Figure 
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2) and the post-harvest period of May-June (Figure 3). Fonnally, DNBlpj' t) ~ 0 VPj for t=JAN-
FEB and DNSlpj't)~ 0 VPj for t=MAR-APR, MAY-JUN, and JUL-AUG. So only during the 
last four months of the calendar year, during the transition from the post-harvest period to the 
hungry season, do urban rice price series not stochastically dominate rural rice price series for 
risk averse peasants. 
Figure 2: January-February Rice Rrices 
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Figure 3: May-June Rice Prices 
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The broad message of this paper is that the geography of agricultural marketing in low-
income countries results in greater objective fo-od price risk being borne by rural residents than 
city-dwellers. } Peasants who seasonally switch between net food seller and net food buyer 
positions are particularly disadvantaged by the price distributions that follow naturally from food 
marketing patterns. Because food price distributions have predictable spatial and temporal 
patterns, disaggregation across both space and time is thus essential to careful food price 
analysis. Price data averaged over space and time (e.g., annual national averages) may mask 
trends of substantial importance to policy design and research on agricultural marketing and 
production, food security and poverty. 
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The results presented here have a clear policy implication. High gross rates of return 
to commercial storage often reflect high real transactions costs that are inversely related to the 
quality of human and physical infrastructure. Even in competitive rural markets, interseasonal 
and intraseasonal supervariability and hungry season superskewness of rural food prices emerge 
naturally where infrastructure is poor. This likely impacts adversely on the welfare and food 
security of credit-constrained net buyer subpopulations, a group increasingly recognized as 
numerous in low-income countries. While government controls on marketing margins cannot 
rectify the problem [Unnevehr 1985], redressal of the root geographic cause of these phenomena 
may generate substantial social returns. Research suggests rural public works projects have 
important effects on demand, supply and food prices when interseasonal flow reversals stem 
from physical infrastructure deficiencies, with generally favorable consequences for rural 
consumption, employment, investment and agricultural production [Ahmed and Donovan, 1992]. 
The present findings add to the evidence that rural infrastructure investment can have 
important positive direct welfare effects on poor peasant populations. Moreover, positive 
indirect effects may be considerable, as well, in that higher risk generally leads to lower rates 
of private inv~stment, creating a sort of vicious circle wherein lower private investment in 
marketing infrastructure leads to high price variability which further discourages market 
development. The prospective "crowding in" effects of public investment in rural 
communications, transport and utilities networks might thus operate not just by increasing 
expected returns to private investment, but by dampening the variability of returns to investment 
as well by dampening price risk. Since investment tends to be an important leading variable in 
employment creation, and rural labor markets are an important component of the portfolio of 
- 16 -
income-generating activities for rural peasants, not to mention landless rural subpopulations, 
rural infrastructure provision may have important indirect welfare effects as well through 
improving investment incentives. 
There are two econometric implications worth remarking on as well. Considerable 
attention has been paid to the relationship between food quality and expenditures, both by those 
striving for accurate estimation of price elasticities [Deaton 1988] and those concerned about the 
effect of income growth or transfers on nutrient intake levels [Pitt, 1983; Behrman and 
Deolalikar, 1987]. Cross-sectional expenditure surveys typically gather recall data from clusters 
of households. While spatial variation in prices (due to transportation costs, for example) is 
admitted, within-cluster variation in unit values (expenditures divided by physical quantities) is 
generally attributed to measurement error and variation in the quality of food purchases. 
Imputed quality variation might be substantially overstated. Where recall periods are more than 
just a matter of days, there may be substantial temporal variation in price as well. Since 
wealthier agricultural households generally wait longer after harvest before entering the market 
as food purchasers, and because food prices rise from harvest due to storage costs, there may 
be a genuine positive correlation in rural expenditure surveys between wealth or income and 
) 
average food prices that is unrelated to any differences in the quality of food purchased. 
Attribution of within-cluster price variability to quality differences will thus tend to bias 
estimates of the relationship between income and food quality upwards, and to bias "quality-
adjusted" estimates of the income elasticity of nutrient demand downwards. 
Finally, recent in advances · in time series analysis have admitted modelling autocorrelated 
heteroskedasticity in commodity price estimation using ARCH/GARCH techniques [e.g., 
- 17 -
Aradhyula and Holt, 1988; Holt and Aradhyula, 1990; Jayne and Myers, 1994; Barrett, 1994b]. 
Table 1 suggests and Barrett [1994b] confmns autoregressive heteroskedasticity' s presence in 
food price series from Madagascar. This is likely a widespread phenomenon that development 
researchers should begin to give more attention, especially by those concerned with agricultural 
price and marketing policy. Moreover, the evidence here suggests that generalization to 
conditional skewness would be fruitful as well, in that there seems to be a dynamic dimension 
to skewness that existing methods do not capture well. This is especially important if downside 
risk aversion matters to economic agents and is routinely addressed through government 
interventions to defend price bands, ceilings and floors. Recent advances in generalizing 
autocorrelation across the moments of stochastic distributions [Hansen, 1994] might thus be of 
interest to development researchers exploring the welfare consequences of food price policies. 
- 18 -
NOTES 
1. Objective price risk is measurable and ignores interpersonal differences in risk preferences 
and information access or utilization (e.g., Bayesian updating). 
2. Timmer[1974], Southworth, Jones and Pearson[1979], Unnevehr [1985], Elz [1987], and 
Loveridge [1991] have reflected on the effects of interseasonal flow reversals on mean 
regional prices, but not on any moments beyond the mean. 
3. This seasonal-switching accentuates that sharp qualitative variation within the agricultural 
sector in farmers' interests regarding food price policy can generate rich coalitional dynamics 
in the political economy of food price policy [Barrett, 1995]. 
4. Preferences with respect to the variability of food prices are actually analytically more 
ambiguous than preferences with respect to income[Finkelshtain and Chalfant, 1991; Barrett, 
1995]. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to develop this point rigorously, the core 
analytical result is that agents are risk averse with respect to variability in a commodity's 
price when either their livelihood or their diet depend on that commodity. For expositional 
purposes I simply assume this to be true of Malagasy peasants, although it invariably holds 
for at least the critical poorest and wealthiest subclasses. 
5. Also, there are often greater food substitution possbilities in urban areas, mitigating urban 
consumers' real income risk exposure due to -food price variability. 
6. One would, for instance, prefer not to rely on the national consumer price index (CPI) to 
deflate these series since the Malagasy CPI is based on a 1968-69 household expenditure 
survey fielded only in the capital city. 
7. The empirical moments from monthly and quarterly distributions were also computed, at 
the cost of degrees of freedom (most serious for the urban series) and facility in separating 
the post-harvest and soudure periods, respectively. The alternative specifications yielded 
qualitatively identical results to those in Table 1, so the fmdings appear robust for this data. 
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